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Abstract
We characterize the unique mixed-strategy equilibrium of an exten-
sion of the "television news sheduling game" of Cancian, Bergström and
Bills (1995) where viewers want to watch the rst newscast broacast after
they return home. A fraction of the viewers record randomly one of the
newscast to watch them in case they are too late. At equilibrium, neither
of the two stations broadcasts its evening news in the rst part of the
evening and the density function is strictly decreasing.
1 Introduction
Cancian, Bergström and Bills (1995) have analyzed the problem of scheduling
evening television newscasts as an "Hotelling location problem with directional
constraints". In this simple but ingenious framework, stations have to decide
the time at which they are going to broadcast their evening news, given that
viewers, who go back at di¤erent times in the evening, watch the rst newscast
broadcast after they return home. They showed that this specic game has no
pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Obviously what characterizes an "Hotelling location problem with direc-
tional constraints" is that consumers care not only about how far they are from
the di¤erent rms but also about on which side the rms are located. Cancian,
Bills and Bergström point out that the scheduling of airline departures is an-
other example of this type of games: a business traveller will take the latest
ight which allows him/her to arrive at his/her destination at a specic time
but no ight which arrives after this time. Another possible example ("voters
leaning towards the left") is in the eld of political economy : each voter is
characterized by his/her ideal policy t and votes for the candidate who is the
closest on the left of this ideal point but never for a candidate on the right of t.
Introducing directional constraints of this kind changes in a substantial way the
outcome of the location game when the players maximize their "audience" (or
the number of voters). Indeed, in the usual Hotelling model without directional
constraints, it is well-known that the stations would broadcast their news at the
median time among the ideal times of the population of viewers.
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When one looks at the times at which the evening news1 are broadcast in
four European countries, one nds a rather important dispersion, except may
be in France where the range is rather narrow: from 19.30 (FR3) to 19H 54
(M6) and 20H (TF1 and A2) It is much larger in RFA: 18.45 (RTL), 20.00
(ARD), 21.45 (ZDF) to name only the main Channels. In Great Britain the
broadcasting times are rather late: 20.00 (BBC 4), 22.00 (BBC 1), 22.30 (BBC
2). Finally in Italy, they are as follows : 18.30 (Studio Aperto), 18.55 (TG
4), 19.00 (TG 3), 20.00 (TG 1 and TG 5), 20.30 (TG2). If the stations are
indeed audience-maximizers2 , this dispersion is an argument which seems to
plead against the usual minimum-di¤erentiation result of the usual Hotelling
model without directional constraints and to suggest a possible mixed-strategy
equilibrium.
In this paper we show that there is unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
of the following extension of the CBB game. We assume that an exogenous
fraction  of the viewers record randomly one of the two evening news : these
viewers watch the recorded news in case where they reach their home too late to
watch one of them on live; the CBB game corresponds to the case where  = 0.
We characterize this equilibrium when the viewers are uniformly distributed on
the interval [0; 1]. At equilibrium neither of the two stations broadcasts its
evening news in the rst part of the evening; depending upon the value of , it
varies between 14and
1
e : The density is shown to be decreasing. Further, for all
time T the probability of broadcasting news before T increases with .
2 The Non-Existence of a Pure Strategy Equi-
librium
Suppose that there are viewers who are uniformly distributed on an interval
[0; T ] It is supposed that a given type t viewer comes back home at time t and
watches the rst newscast which is broadcast after his/her return if he/she can
do so while a fraction  2 [0; 1] of those missing the last news will watch them as
they have been wise enough to record one of them which they randomly recorded
before leaving home There are two stations which broadcast the evening news
and each station i (= 1; 2) has to choose at which time Ti 2 [0; T ] it will
broadcast its evening news in order to maximize its audience. Let T = 1 for
the sake of simplicity but without any loss of generality. The payo¤s of the two
stations are simply dened as
1 In some cases it is di¢ cult to have a clearcut ditinction between and evening and night
news.
2 If audience-maximizing is a debatable assumption for characterizing free-to-air Channels
behavior in general we think that it is a rather sensible "intermediate assumption" regarding
more specically the evening news which may be preceded and followed but not interrupted
by advertising slots Having more people watching the news generally means more people
watching the advertising slots before and after the news.
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A1 = T1 +

2
(1  T2) , A2 = T2   T1 + 
2
(1  T2) ; if T1 < T2 (1)
A1 = T1   T2 + 
2
(1  T1) ; A2 = T2 + 
2
(1  T1) , if T1 > T2
A1 = A2 =
 + (1  )T
2
if T1 = T2 = T
This game has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. If its competitor j broad-
casts its evening news before Tm the best reply of station i is to broadcast its
own news at Ti = 1, i.e. as late as possible. If j broadcasts its news after Tm
the best strategy for i is to broadcast its evening news just before j.
3 The Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium
We rst characterize the unique symmetrical equilibrium with absolutely con-
tinuous distribution functions. Then, we show that this is in fact the unique
mixed-strategy equilibrium of this game. In what follows, we denote by F the
cumulative and by f the density.
Proposition 1 If both medias choose absolutely continuous distribution func-
tions with a connected support, the broadcasting news game has a unique,symmetrical,
mixed strategy equilibrium where (i) both rms select F (Ti) = 2  
2
 1p
Ti
for all
Ti 2
h
(1  2 )
2
 ; 1
i
and F (Ti) = 0 for all Ti 2
h
0; (1  2 )
2

i
when  6= 0 and
(ii) both rms select F (Ti) = ln(Ti) + 1 for all Ti 2

1
e ; 1

and F (Ti) = 0 for all
Ti 2

0; 1e

when  = 0:
Proof : At any such mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, given the strategy
f(Tj) of station j station i must have the same expected pay-o¤ whatever its
broadcasting time Ti provided it belongs to the interval [; ] :
Z Ti

(Ti(1  
2
)  Tj + 
2
)f(Tj)dTj +
Z 
Ti

Ti +

2
   Tj
2

f(Tj)dTj = C
where C is the constant expected audience. Di¤erentiating with respect
to Ti we obtain

2
(1  Ti) f(Ti)+(1 
2
)
Z Ti

f(Tj)dTj 

2
(1  Ti) + Ti

f(Ti)+
Z 
Ti
f(Tj)dTj = 0
i.e. after simplications
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 Tif(Ti) + 1  
2
F (Ti)) = 0
so that the equilibrium mixed strategy F satisfy the rst order linear
di¤erential equation:
dF
dx
=
1
x
  F (x)
2x
which admits as a solution
F (x) =
2

  p
x
when  6= 0 (2)
or
F (x) = lnx when  = 0
Obviously  must be strictly positive. On the other hand, we must have
 = 1 as if this did not hold true, by choosing a broadcasting time equal
to 1 a rm i would trivially have a larger expected audience.
Now  = 1 implies  = 2   1 when  6= 0 and  = e when  = 0: and
therefore :
F () =
2

  ( 2

  1)  2 = 0
leading to  =
 
1  2
 2
 .
We note that  =
 
1  2
 2
 is decreasing with respect to . This means that
the broadcasting of news is likely to shift later in the evening if the proportion
of households holding and using a recorder decreases. Note that  converges to
1
e when  tends to 0:We plot below the probability that a station broadcasts its
evening news before time t when  = 0. The median time at which a station
broadcasts its news is approximately 0:606531
Figure 1
We now show that the absolutely continuous equilibrium described in propo-
sition 1 is unique as there are no equilibria with atoms and (or) disconnected
supports.
Lemma 2 A station is equilibrium distribution function cannot have an atom
at some x < 1
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Proof. Suppose that the contrary is true. Then we show that there exists  > 0
such that PrfTj 2 [x; x + ]g = 0: Indeed there always exists an arbitrarily
small but strictly positive " such that the expected pay-o¤ of j when playing
x  " is larger than when playing x+ " : there is indeed a rst-order gain from
discontinuously reducing the probability that station i is going to broadcast
its news before station j which straightforwardly outweighs a second-order loss
from reaching a slightly lower audience by broadcasting a bit earlier. Now
station i would clearly gain by choosing a slightly later broadcasting time than
x (the probability that Ti > Tj would be unchanged while the audience would
be increased) and so the equilibrium distribution function of i cannot have an
atom at x:
Lemma 3 The supports of the equilibrium distribution functions are connected.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that station i0s equilibrium distribution func-
tion has a "hole" between x and y where y > x. It is straightforward to show
that then, there exists some " such that station j would be better o¤ by broad-
casting at y rather than at some t 2 [x   "; y) : the discontinuous increase in
audience compensates (and outweights for t > x  ") the increase in the proba-
bility that Tj > Ti: Thus js equilibrium distribution must have a hole between
x   " and y: Applying the same argument, we can now show that station i0s
equilibrium distribution function must have a hole beginning from some x  ,
where  > 0; to y, hence a contradiction.
It remains to show that the connected equilibrium distribution functions
cannot have an atom at 1:
Lemma 4 The equilibrium distribution functions are atomless.
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Proof. From Lemmas 1 and 2, the equilibrium distribution functions are con-
nected and cannot have atoms at some t < 1: Suppose that the distribution
function of player i has an atom at 1, i.e. station i broadcasts its news at
Ti = 1 with a operability 1 > p > 0: From Lemma 2 the support of its dis-
tribution function must be an interval [i; 1] with
R 1
i
f(Ti)dTi = 1   p: On
the other hand the support of j0s distribution function must be a semi-open
interval [j ; 1) (given that is distribution has an atom at 1, station j will never
broadcast at Tj = 1 ). . Since j has the same equilibrium expected pay-o¤
from broadcasting at any time in [i; 1) it must be3 that fi(Ti) = 1TT
1  2p
Ti
so that
R 1
i
fi(Ti)dTi = 1   p entails that i =

2 
2 p
 2

: Applying the same
reasoning to station j
R 1
j
fj(Tj)dTj = 1 entails j =
 
1  2
 2
 < i: However
this is impossible in equilibrium since station j would earn a greater pay-o¤ by
broadcasting its new at Tj = i rather than at any j  Tj < i4 :
Our last result describes the comparative statics of the equilibrium with
respect to .
 Proposition 2 For all  2 [0; 1], let F(x) = 2  
2
 1p
x
over the intervalh 
1  2
 2
 ; 1
i
. Then if  < 0, F dominates F0 according to rst
degree stochastic dominance.
Proof Let t  2 . Under this change of variable, the function F , now
denoted , is dened as follows :
(t) = t  t  1
x
1
t
with t 2 [2;+1[
We now prove that :
	(t)  0(t)  0
Straightforward calculations lead to :
	(t) = 1  1 +
(t 1) ln x
t2
e
ln x
t
Therefore 	(t)  0 i¤ a(t)  b(t) where :
a(t)  e ln xt and b(t)  1 + (t  1) lnx
t2
Note that :
a0(t) =   lnx
t2
e
ln x
t > 0 since x  1
3See above equation (2) and use  = 2

  1:
4Of course a similar argument holds when  = 0:
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and
b0(t) =
t  2
t3
lnx < 0 since t  2
This implies that 	(s)  0 for all s 2 [2;+1[ i¤ lim
t!1a(t)  limt!1b(t). Since
:
lim
t!1a(t) = limt!1b(t) = 1
the conclusion follows and the proof is completed.
4 Conclusion
We have shown that the "television news scheduling game" has a unique strategy
equilibrium and we have characterized this equilibrium. The interest of this
game goes beyond the simple understanding of evening news scheduling by TV-
Channels. The model introduced by Cancian, Bergström and Bills is an extreme
case of Hotelling location problems with directional constraints when moving
towards the left or towards the right is completely impossible. A more general
analysis of Hotelling location games with directional constraints where moving
towards the right is more costly than moving towards the left, or the reverse,
would certainly be interesting. with possible applications in political economy.
This is on our research agenda.
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